А то, что изменчиво, мучительно или приятно?

Мучительность не в том, что радостное наступит, а в том, что оно кончится.

Dependent-Origination Contextualized

   ‘‘What do you think, Rahula, is the eye permanent or impermanent?’’
   ‘‘Impermanent, sir.’’
   ‘‘And what is impermanent - is it joy or pain?’’
   ‘‘Pain, sir.’’
   ‘‘And is what is impermanent, pain, and characterized by change worthy of being viewed as ‘this is mine, this is what I am, this is my self.’’
   ‘‘Not at all, sir.’’37

This quote form the Cularahulovada-sutta of the MN is an example of the most common expression of the teaching of the anatta doctrine in the Nikayas. As has been pointed out by a number of scholars, it makes little sense, if any at all, unless it is understood in light of the Upanisadic doctrine of the atman.38 There is clearly no logical necessity that whatever is impermanent must be pain, and that whatever is pain not be the self. The fact that the toothache I suffered from last week was impermanent is of much joy to me, and this doesn’t at all convince me that it had nothing to do with my self. Quite the contrary, actually. But if the Self (capital S!) is defined as permanent bliss, then this most central teaching begins to make sense. If Self means only permanence and joy, then the factors of the personality cannot be regarded as the Self since they are associated with change and pain. Therefore the empirical self has no clear point of reference. This conclusion—that the teaching of non-selfhood makes sense only in relation to the Upanisadic concept of the atman—is understood to apply also to another important exposition of the anatta doctrine in the Nikayas, i.e., the argument about lack of control over the aggregates.39
_________
38 Gombrich (1996, pp. 14–17), Vetter (1988, pp. 38–41), Collins (1982, p. 97).
    Gombrich, R. (1996). How Buddhism began. London & Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Athlone.
    Vetter, T. (1988). The ideas and meditative practices of early Buddhism. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
    Collins, S. (1982). Selfless persons: Imagery and thought in Theravada Buddhism. Cambridge: Cambridge, University Press.
39 See the references in the previous footnote. The argument about lack of control states that if the aggregates were the self one would have complete control of them. This argument often supplements the exposition of the anatta doctrine based on the ‘‘three marks’’ (impermanence, suffering, and not-self). Personally, I find this argument convincing even without reference to the Upanisadic atman.

"Pleasant feeling is pleasant in remaining, & painful in changing, friend Visakha. Painful feeling is painful in remaining & pleasant in changing. Neither-pleasant-nor-painful feeling is pleasant in occurring together with knowledge, and painful in occurring without knowledge." (MN 44)